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I. INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the developing world, the commercialization of 
agriculture has been highly ambiguous in its effects. On the one 
hand, it has brought prosperity to rural farm families. On the 
other, it has produced political grievances and generated social 
conflict. These paradoxical consequences have been as true in 
Africa as they have elsewhere in the developing world. In this 
essay, I look at the relationship between the commercialization 
of agriculture and the rise of political protest, in that continent. 
And I do so by addressing the question: Why would rural dwellers 
find it reasonable to demand political action in support of their 
efforts to make themselves economically better off by seeking to 
take advantage of commercial markets for their products? 
In answering this question, I will examine several of 
the major issues which arose in the countryside during the colonial 
period in Africa. These issues include protests over governmental 
regulation of agricultural p�oduction, protests concerning the 
structure of markets, conflicts over land tenure, and disputes over 
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Foundation grant number NSF 4 SOC 77-08573. no way responsible for the contents of this 
the National Science 
The Foundation is in 
paper. 
1 
taxes. Taken together, confrontations over these issues tna e up II of the rural political agenda in Africa during the colonihl periol 
Some of these issues were more significant in slm pla�I 
'h� 1n "'here. Diepu'e' over 'he '''"c'�• of �rke'e �e frel 
quently arose in the forest areas of West Africa and in the cotto 
producing regions about Lake Victoria, whereas conflicts lv r la� 
I Ill use regulations most frequently arose in the savanah farm!l ds of
l E Af . Th 1 . . . f . f h . I. II ast rica. e re ative signi icance o t e issues varil..e over
time as well. Disputes over land tenure were most importln at ii,, 
onset of the large-scale commercialization of agriculture1, I hat � 
Ill the CCT iri the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, whi�e 
vation issue rose to prominence after the intensificatioJ o 
agricultural production had begun to make a major impact lonlthe 
environment and ecology of the farming areas -- i.e. in the 1930s 
and 1940s. The importance of these issues thus varied ovkr spac� 
time. But, over the continent as a whole and over the colo ial � 
in its entirety, these issues accounted for a large portiln of t�I, 
And the! s cces�I. 
ful exploitation of these issues by nationalist politiciahslenab� 
them to mobilize rural political support for the movemenJs 
political grievances of the African countryside. 
hi ch 
made Africa ungovernable by foreign powers and thereby lJd o po' 
independence throughout most of sub-Saharan Africa. 
II. HISTORIAL BACKGROUND 
The rise 
part a response to 
of commercial agriculture in Africa was tn la 
the nineteenth century growth of the Jco omijll 
2 
ch 
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Europe. In the nineteenth century, Britain's industrial revolution 
neared completion, and Germany rapidly became a major industrial 
power. While the economies of other areas of Europe offer a more 
ambiguous record, it is nonetheless true that the nineteenth century 
saw the establishment of many of Europe's major industrial centers --
3 
centers of mining, heavy industry and manufacturing; centers of commerce, 
finance, and shipping; and major urban areas. 
With the transformation of the European economy came a 
rise in demand for Africa's primary products. This demand found its 
origins in the new technologies employed by European enterprises; in 
the increased number and higher average incomes of Europe's popula-
tion; in changes in taste, some of which were associated with a move 
to an urban and industrial life style ; and shifts in 
the relative price of Africa's products by comparison with close 
substitutes -- shifts in part accounted for by changes in transport 
technologies and in part by apparent inelasticities in alternative 
sources of supply. 
It is obvious but important: Europe's industrial revolu-
tion was in large part based on the use of machines. The machines 
required lubrication. Not until the 1860s were petroleum products 
available, however; and until that time the oils and fats produced 
from animal and vegetable sources served as the basic source of 
lubricants. While the fats and oils produced by animals appear to 
have provided most of the lubricants, the increased use of 
machinery drove up the price of these products to the point where 
vegetable oils, though technically inferior, nonetheless became 
attractive as substitutes. A major result was a rise in the de 
of palm products from West Africa. 
The growth of Europe's urban population, the rise lin 
 average incomes in Europe, and the change in tastes associatled w� 
the move to an urban and industrial life style -- these tlo lhad 
I important consequences for Africa's rural economies. Theirjeffec 
are perhaps best seen in the growth of demand for candles l a d so] 
Both products use animal and vegetable oils; but, in the case of 
both products, vegetable oils soon displaced animal prodults. I
p�c, Chey did en elmply beeauee of cheir Ceehnieal eupe,inticy; 
in soaps, for example, the vegetable oils were less likely no 
discolor and they produced an odor that consumers found mbr 
attractive.1 Palm oil, palm kernel oil, cotton seed oil, l and 
groundnuts -- these were the major sources of vegetable oils for 
cheee prnduece. And Afriea, al�g wich ocher crnpieal •1ea
became an important source of supply for these commodities. 
Larger numbers of consumers and higher personall incomes 
In the nineteenth 
century, Africa was seen as a particularly important sourle 
also led to an increased demand for cotton. 
of s 
for this commodity because alternative suppliers had provld
Lachcashire "cotton famines" were periodic events in the ii· 
century. The American civil war in the 1860s and the sprlad of 
boll weevil in the 1890s made for unpredictable and increls�ngly 
expeneiwe auppliee of '"''� Co Che BriCieh millere and � 
efforts on their part to develop alternative sources. T�ey 
I unreJJ 
II eteen
therefore sought out new areas for cotton growing. I Part of
4 
ly 
ble. 
Livingstone's mandate was to search for sites for cotton 
production in Africa, and the reports from connnercial and 
5 
governmental sources in Africa convinced the British manufacturer� 
that the interior of that continent offered good prospects. In 
league with the heavy steel industry -- itself recessed due to 
the completion of orders for the manufacture of engines, 
bridges, and rails for the European, Russian, American, and Indian 
railways -- the cotton manufacturers backed the building of railways 
into the interior of Africa and the promotion of cotton production 
therein.2
The rise in the average incomes of European consumers and 
shifts in taste also increased the demand for "luxury" products. 
Cocoa furnishes an example of such a connnodity. First intro-
duced as a beverage, cocoa then penetrated the confectionary market 
in the form of milk chocolate -- a product first introduced in the 
late 1870s. Coffee too appears to have benefited from such changes 
in tqste, but also important was the behavior of other suppliers. 
Thus, the attempt by Sao Paulo producers to force a price rise in 
the world coffee market in the early 1900s created favorable 
conditions for the establishment of a coffee industry in Africa. 
Technological change also played an important part in the 
rising demand for African cash crops. In the mid-nineteenth century, 
the development of steamships on the one hand and the opening of the 
Suez Canal on the other dramatically lowered transport costs 
I enhanced the relative position of African producers in the Eu
market. The development of hydrogenation in the 1920s alsolr 
a major boon to African producers. The rising costs of anima 
ducts had made oleo an expensive ingredient in the manufacthr
margarine; but vegetable oils tended to melt at room temperlt 
With the development of hydrogenation, a technique for "harhe 
vegecable oile, vegecable oile beo� a ceohnioally feaaibt• 
tute for oleo, and the producers of vegetable oils won a new 
for their output. 
d 
op ea� 
lliJltl prese ed
proj 
of 
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Changes in the basic factors of demand on the Eurf pean 
market -- the number of consumers, their average incomes, the 
technologies of production, and the behavior of alternative! s�pplie 
thus led to an increased demand for the products grown in Afr�ca. 
African farmers responded by producing crops for export to lh
I 
.
European market:
3 
palm oil, palm kernels, cocoa, cotton, cojffe 
!and groundnuts. 
TABLES ABOUT HERE 
The transformation of African agriculture was no : c�:f::��
I solely to the production of cash crops for export, however. 
I 
'took place in the production of food crops for the domestic arkJklllof 
Africa. The transporting, bulking, and shipping of export 1crpps 
required the formation of basic infrastructure; among the oas�c 
facilities required were railways and harbors. 
The first railways were completed in the early 1900s. IBasic 
harbor facilities were also begun in the early 1900s . A maj or expan­
sion in the railways , through the construction of spur lines , and 
a maj or upgrading of the harbor facilities , through the construction 
of deep water berths , warehouses , and wharves ,  took place in associa-
tion with the connnodity boom of the 1920s . The construction of rail-
ways and harbors led to the growth of an African labor force . By 
1920,  the population of Dakar had reached 30 , 000;  Accra, 38,000; and 
Lagos , 100 , 000.  In the early 1930s , the mining companies of the 
Zambian copperbelt employed over 30 , 000 people . 4 The growth of
wage labor in Africa entailed a rise in the demand for food . Maize , 
rice , casava , meat , fish , millet -- these and other connnodities 
which the subsistence farmers had produced for themselves could now 
be sold for a profit . 
The rise in demand for cash crops for export and the rise 
in demand for food crops for local consumption -- both generated 
opportunities for higher rural incomes. 5 The question we ask is why 
and in what way did the growth of economic opportunity lead to the 
rise of political protest? To answer this ques tion we will examine 
some of the basic issues that arose in conjunction with the growth 
of connnercial production in the African countryside . 
III . THE STRUCTURE OF MARKETS 
One of the primary issues which promoted agrarian protest 
in colonial Africa was the s tructure of the markets faced by the 
7 
producers of cash crops . The connnercialization of agriculture promoted 
significant economic gains ; but , in some cases , the producers faced cartels 
which sought to appropriate these gains by engaging in pric'e 
behavior.  Collusion on the part of the purchasers of the els 
furnished an incentive for the producers
. 
to combine and so le 
market power in an effort to increase their profits.  
One example of this kind of behavior is provided lbyl the 
producers in the Gold Coast .  The maj or links between the cocda 
 by merchant Houses 
' ·1 11 
producers and the European markets were provided 
these merchant houses handled both the export of cocoa froml t�e Go] 
Coast to Europe and the importation into the Gold Coast of coJsume] I 
products from the European market . For a variety of reasonb 1here 
  I . 6 were significant economies of scale in the import-export busi ess 
consolidation therefore took place within the industry and bh 
number of merchant houses declined . By 1937 , the largest 
four of these firms marketed over two-thirds of the Gold Coasl coco 
crop . Because they so dominated the market ,  these few firjs ould� I 
by combining, effectively set the price of cocoa to their Jdv ntag� I 
and so appropriate much of the gains to be made from the prbd ctio� 
of cocoa. The best documented of their attempts to do so cbmes 
from the 1930s.  
Early in 193 7 ,  the maj or merchant houses began negotiati 
in an effort to collude in the purchase of that year ' s  outJut 
by autumn , they had developed a market sharing agreement . 7 I 0 
the 18th of September, the headquarters of the firms in Englahd 
sent letters of instruction to their buyers in the Gold Colst
outlining the procedures to be followed in purchasing the Jro
 
procedures , of course ,  were designed to remove incentives for 
tH 
 
competition between the local buyers and thereby depress tpe lprice 
8 
oa 
they offered the cocoa farmers . Rumors were rife in the Gold Coast 
about the activities of the maj or firms ; local newspapers openly 
speculated concerning the possibility of an agreement.  In the words 
of the Nowell report : 
By [mid-October] the formation of the so-called "Pool" was 
becoming widely known , and in a circular letter dated 14th 
of October, the President of the Provincial Council of Chiefs 
of the Central Province called an emergency meeting of the 
Council to "protest against this selfish and inimical policy 
enunciated by the trading firms . "8 
As land owners , cocoa farmers , and holders of stocks of cocoa, and as 
political leaders in the farming areas , the chiefs had maj or 
interest in preventing a forceful reduction in the price of cocoa. 
They therefore combined with the farmers and attempted to form, in 
effect, a producers ' cartel , and so rival the power achieved by 
the merchant houses in the market for their products . By passing 
ordinances in their Native Authorities , issuing edicts , and even 
invoking traditional oaths , the chiefs,  in league with the farmers ,  
sought t o  withhold cocoa from the market until they had secured a 
price rise from the merchant houses . The resultant cocoa boyco tt 
led to the large-scale politicization of the rural interior of the 
Gold Coas t ,  and furnished one of the historical legends that shaped 
the nationalist consciousness of the colony ' s  rural population . 
A similar situation arose in East Africa, where the pro-
ducers of cotton also faced a noncompetitive market one that was 
used by the purchasers and processors of the commodity to lower the 
price they paid for the farmers ' output . Again, the structure of the 
market furnished an incentive for the producers to combine . In 
the case of East Africa, the farmers combinations took the form of 
9 
cooperative socities -- agencies which the 
break the power of the purchasers and thus 
from cash crop production . 
farmers tried tio 
to realize higAer 
J 
Ill prof ti!! 
In the production and processing of cotton in East Afr���· 
economies of scale tended to concentrate in the ginning, ls ppoJ l  
co che gcow<ng, of ooCCon . The ginnec• had celacively hilh fix.j 
costs : the buildings and machinery of the gineries reprele ted Jl1 
nificant capital investments . Moreover , the machines , at[lejast ,  
10 
could be used for no other purpose than ginning and so stioodl idlernltor 
much of the year . An important consideration for a prospecrlive 
 
investor in ginning , then , was the certainty of a high volume of 
cotton for processing at the time of harvest . 
To promote cotton production in East Africa , the overn' 
of the area sought to promote investments in ginning capabi y; Jl 
to secure such investments ,  they sought ways of guaranteiin 
to prospective investors a high volume of produce for each in. [ 
the case of both Uganda and Tanganyika , the maj or cotton kr wing I
h h f d d . . 1. . Iareas , t e governments t ere ore passe or inances requir�n ginnr 
licenses , and they restricted the number of licenses thatl cduld 
cifie 
ts 
g 
be issued . Moreover, they formed marketing zones . In a sp 
area about each gin , only buyers who sold to that gin werl ermi���d 
to operate ; and no shipping across the zones was allowed. 
curtailment of competition on the part of the ginners natur 
led co a deoli� in Che pcioe offeced che f�eca foe chef' 
One result was protest on the part of the produce 
for example, in 1934 "all the saza chiefs in Busoga signek 
he 
lly 
produ 
s .  ']] 
le JI 
9 
s ,  
to the provincial colillllissioner expressing . . .  their dislike of 
zoning, which 'gives an opportunity to the cotton buyers to reduce 
the prices of cotton , knowing that people cannot remove their cotton 
and sell it in other neighbouring districts • . •  
, .. 10 Another 
result was the formation of the cooperative movement .  The farmers 
sought to form cooperatives which would buy and gin cotton ; by 
entering the market ,  the farmers sought to insure for themseives 
better prices than those offered by the cartelized ginners and so 
reap more the gains from cash crop production . One movement of 
this kind was the famous Victoria Federation of Cooperative Unions 
in Tanganyika -- a society that helped to form the nucleus of the 
nationalist movement in the north eastern regions of that 
territory . 11 Another was the Uganda African Farmers Union . The 
Farmers Union made the grievances of the cotton producers a 
central issue in the 1949 disturbances in Uganda -- disturbances 
that lay the foundation for the postwar period of national 
protest in that territory . 12 
IV . PRODUCTION EXTERNALITIES , GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION , AND 
POLITICAL PROTEST 
Producers of cash crops in Africa thus sometimes faced 
a market structure which threatened to divert much of the gains to 
be had from commercial agriculture to other parties in the industry. 
Collusion on the part of others served as an incentive for the 
producers themselves to combine. And attempts to achieve the power 
to influence prices in the marketplace thus motivated collective 
11 12 
action in the countryside of Africa. 
A second group of issues arose around externalit�es gene ed 
in the production of cash crops . Externalities occur when th II 
activities of one producer directly influence the production oss il:llltll.i­
ti"' of anoci>er. If <he activHy of one prod�er adveml1 a foct� 
the profits of another , in the absence of market mechanisms f r II 
creating incentives to adj ust his behavior ,  the first prodjce will 
engage in =re of that activity ch= is d"'irable ; gr�ter to al p�� 
could be secured by producers as a whole were he to reduce th deg 
to which he engaged in that activity. If the activity create 
beneficial effects for the second party , in the absence of lma�ket 
mechanisms for creating incentives for the first producer to bro-
vide the beneficial.externality , he will engage in less of Ith 
activity than is desirable .  Under such circumstances , there are 
gains to be made if the government were to intervene in thl
market and provide the incentives for the first producer tl 
increase the level at which he employs the activity which ke erat�i 
external effects .  In the case of cash crop production in � ·ca , I
its 
· 1 . · h b h  · · negative externa 1t1es appear to ave een more common t an positl!'lr 
ones ; and the colonial government had frequently to curtail ctivllWes 
which were privately profitable but oociaUy =deairable . A aj o� 
result was protest on the part of cash crop producers who be efitl" 
from the use of externality-producing production techniquel and 
a willingness to turn against the colonial government . 
One common source of production externalities was 
During the Second World War, the colonial government promole 
rosiei" 
the 
13 
production of cash crops and at a maximum rate,  irrespective of the 
effects on the ecology or the environment .  In East Africa , for example ,  
.they vigorously championed the production of maize , largely 
as a way of securing food for troops in the Mideast and North Africa . 
One result was extreme monocropping , with the attendant depletion of 
the soils; another was the extension of cash-crop production into 
increasingly marginal lands . The result of both trends was increased 
soil erosion. 
lln important example of this problem arose in the Uluguru 
mountains of north eastern Tanzania. The mountains formed an important 
watershed and were the source of several streams and rivers . 
In response to the increased demand for food , producers had 
moved up the mountains and cleared them of trees , shrub s ,  and ground-
cover so as to put them into production . According to government 
sources , the effect of increased production on the hills was 
decreased production downstream. With less ground cover, the soils 
of the hills retained the rain waters for a shorter period than 
before . One result was downstream flooding and the loss of crops 
by those who planted alluvial gardens . Moreover , with the more 
precipitate release of the waters deposited by the rains , the dry 
season level of the rivers declined . Salt water from the ocean there-
fore moved further up stream; the result was increased salinization 
and a loss in the fertility of the soils near the rivers . 
As is true everywhere in Africa , the maj or concentrations 
of population were located along the rivers of northeastern Tanzania . 
14 
and their loss of crops due to the increased runoff from the I hil ls n!n 
tain lll, offset the increase in the production of foodstuffs by the mou 
The colonial government was unable to devise mechali 
whereby the downstream producers could make it to the advantlg 
<he hill"ide producer" <o ol�r le"" land , or whereby <he �n 
producers could compensate the downstream farmers for the dama 
they inflicted by bringing the hillsides into production . Jns 
the government had to attempt to use political power to altJr 
productive practices of the hillside farmers . Using its leJal 
powers , the government sought to compel the hillside farmerJ 
to make bench terraces so as to curtail runoff from the hilJs .
farmers resisted the government ' s  efforts . At first ,  they Jtt
to bribe the government ' s  agents ; when that failed , they 
ms 
of 
ain 
e wh 
ead, 
he 
The 
.mpte 
turned to violence . In 1956 , riots broke out , troops were ca]led 
in, and people were killed in the confrontation which folloled, . 
I 
A new group of rural dwellers j oined the antigovernment coalitlion 
formed by the nationalist movement . 13
Erosion is one source of externalities , and measures 
taken to control it led to political protest throughout East 
Africa . 14 Another source of externalities are crop disease1; 
an important source of rural political protest in West Afrila 
the attempts of the colonial governments to control the sprla 
diseases through the cocoa industry of that region . 
and 
ere 
of 
In 19 36 , officials of the department of agriculturejof t� 
Gold Coast first noted the death of cocoa trees in the oldet ro- I 
I . 
ducing areas : New Juaben and Akim Abuakwa . They were suffic"entl� 
e than 
oducers . 
concerned to investigate further, and upon doing so , they discovered 
that significant infestation had taken place over an area of 200 
square miles . Because of the physical markings which it left on 
the trees , the disease was called "swollen shoot . "  At first it was 
15 
misdiagnosed , and only after the completion of a new research station 
the first agricultural research station to be built in the Gold Coast 
was the government able to recognize the disease as a virus whose 
vector was the mealie bug. What made the virus so difficult to con-
trol was that ants served as hosts for the mealie bugs and provided 
protective shelters for them -- shelters which made the insects 
inaccessible to sprays . The only viable control was the 
destruction of diseased trees; included in these efforts were 
adj acent , apparently healthy trees , but ones which may well have 
provided shelter for the infected insects . Following World War 
II, the government launched its control program. 15
The maj or problem faced by the government was the resistance 
of the farmers themselves . And a principal reason for the clash 
between the farmers and the government was that each farmer evalu-
ated the control measure from the point of view of his own private 
gains and losses , whereas the government took into account the 
effects of his behavior on other cocoa producers . A farmer who 
kept diseased trees in production -- and trees often .. would continue to 
produce for several harvests after infestation -- would continue to 
earn profits , but he would be imposing costs on other farmers , in 
terms of increasing the probability of the infestation of their farms . 
Were there a way that other farmers could charge a farmer lwi�h 
diseased trees for the inj ury he inflicted on their healtliy 
ones , then control measures could perhaps have been volunJar�ly 
faple-'ed. Moreover, hrui <he gov•�" undm'°ud "J •f"rol 
ties problem, they may have been more ready at the outset I t� rewjll I. 
stinl· the afflicted producers for lessening the probability of �nf 
the farms of others . But the West African governments did nbt 
understand this aspect of the problem and they ref used cojpe 
tion ; as one Nigerian official put it , why pay-compensatiln
sa-
I 
when "the farmers are receiving the cutting out services £or 
(quoted in Beer , p .  55) . Instead , using their legal poweJs ,  
free 
the 
Instead , using their legal powers , the governments simply !coerced 
the farmers . Government agents would move from one farm tlo the 
next . Locating diseased trees , they would mark the farm. I Tllen 
the work gangs would arrive , and , in the words of one farmer" 
"The farms became a plane field within an hour • . • •  11
17 In 
the Gold Coas t ,  the cutting out program began in January 194 
 1948 over 600 , 000 trees had been removed from over 2 , 500 acr 
 
; b� 
18 s; I rog and in that year , the farmers rose against the government l s 
Protesting cutting out , they j oined in the 1948 dis turbances! thati 
 
led to basic constitutional reforms in the colony . Mobilized in 
large part through the issue of disease control,  they j oile& the 
political coalition that brought an end to British rule il 
colony . 19 lIt arises , for example , under conditions of common proper y.  
at 
I 
Collective rights in grazing land promote mismanagement of ]and 
16 
6 
ources .  
Under conditions of collective grazing rights , if one producer 
restricts his herd size to a level that is socially optimal, 
given the carrying capacity of the land , he simply confers 
·.a benefit upon the other producers who share in the rights to
graze livestock on that land . The result is that private incentives 
fail to produce the correct choice of herd size, and , in the absence 
of government intervention, the lands are overgrazed . Attempts 
by the government to reduce herd sizes led ,  however, to clashes 
b etween the government ' s  vision of the public good and the producers ' 
perception of their own best interes t .  Destocking often b ecame 
an issue that led to the mobilization of the arid land farmers 
. h 1 . 1 20 against t e co onia governments . 
Collective rights to fisheries also led to the politiciza-
tion of rural populations . Thus , in Zambia, conflicts b etween the 
fishermen and the government which imposed regulations in an attempt 
to prevent the depletion of the Lake Mweru fishery -- controls 
over net sizes , fishing during the spawning s eason, etc .  -� 
furnished a basis for incorporating the Luapula fisheries into 
the nationalist movement . 21
Externalities also arose in the establishment of quality 
standards . The purchasers of many of the export crops of 
Africa were willing to off er only one price -- one that reflected 
their appraisal of the average quality of the crop . Insofar as 
it was cheaper to produce a low quality product , each farmer was 
b etter off marketing a low quality of output while being 
_paid the price for an average quality product . But when all farmers 
17 
b ehaved in this way , then the average quality of output declirled . 
rational b ehavior of each farmer thus imposed costs on all f a�mers 
in the form of a lowering of the market price. In the abselca of
a willingness on the part of purchasers to offer a spectruj o 
prices for a variety of quality standards , the governments lnlcash 
crop growing areas therefore felt compelled to intervene ajd to ma• 
by administrative methods a high standard of marketed outpJt . I  The 
once again , was conflict between cash crop producers and tJe 
The colonial government s' attempts to promot e  so�l 
control crop diseases , and increase the quality of product�on l thus 
increasing state intervention in the agricultural industriJs 
over 
I onse
f Af 
iancIn 'h• abo�c• of mochani� 'ha' �uld "''"'' volun,a<y c1mp 
rules that would maximiz e the prof its of the producers as a w�ole, 
colonial governments felt comp elled to administratively coJstrain 
b ehavior of African farmers.  Under the impact of governmeJt tegul' 
producers who generated negative externalities experienced la 
in their private profits . They resented b eing coerced into a 
a lower level of economic reward . And they therefore were wi 
to turn against the colonial governments and to back the e1fo
. l" l" . . h h 1 . 1 23 nationa ist po iticians to overt row t e co onia regimes . 
V .  THE STRUCTURE OF LAND RIGHTS 
cep1 
ling 
ts d 
With the prospects of profits from agriculture camel an 
increas e in the value of land . The allocation of thes e gaJns , amo 
competing claimants was largely determined by the allocatiln of 1 1 
rights , and the ultimate adjudicator of that allocation wal tlhe 
18 
e 
ain 
sult , 
22 nt . 
tion, 
d to
a. 
ith 
re 
on, 
19 
state . Control over the state and its legal system was therefore 
sought by those seeking to gain economic benefits from commercial 
farming .  
Struggles between indigenous peoples and highly capitalized 
foreign immigrants constituted one set of such disputes . Thus , 
for example , in Kenya, the colonial adminis tration won a ruling from 
the legal officers of the crown that all waste and unoccupied land 
in the colony was crown land ; the colonial government was the legal 
agent of the crown in the East African Protectorate , and it therefore 
became the legal owner of "waste and unoccupied" lands in that area. 
Both the indigenous human and livestock populat ions had declined 
precipitately as a result of famines and pestilence in the 1870s ; 
and as indigenous agricultural technology depended in any case on 
long and extensive land rotations , much of the land in Kenya appeared 
to be waste or unoccupied . Employing the legal ruling as a basis 
for determining land rights thus transferred legal rights over 
vast acreages from the indigenous farm families to the colonial 
administration . And the administration rapidly transferred its 
rights to immigrant commercial farmers . Protests over the loss of 
land rights subsequently formed the basis for much of the nationalist 
. K 24 movement in enya. 
In Ghana , disputes between the farmers and the state over 
rights to "waste" lands also gave rise to popular movements of 
political protest against the colonial order . In a series of 
ordinances ,  the Government of the Gold Coast in the late nineteenth 
century attempted to transfer rights over waste and unoccupied 
lands to the crown . But the indigenous population , led by the rural 
chiefs and the legal and commercial elites of the coastal 
vigorously opposed this action . They defended the rights 
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native population to this resource , and argued that though l ands 
presently be unexploited, nonetheless rights over them were well 
defined under the traditional legal system. A maj or reasoj for 
their resistance to the transfer of lands rights to the crlwnJ was 
that both the chiefs and the coastal elites had begun to pJof�t 
I from the exercise of their land rights . An active market in l and 11 !11/-ld 
in concessions for its use had begun in the Gold Coast -- 1 marked 
that allowed the chiefs and the coastal elites to share in Ith 
economic benefits deriving from control over this valuable l inbut 
. t . 1 h d . 25 T h . ' li. in o commercia cas crop pro uction. o promote t eir res s tan 
to the alienation of lands to foreign control ,  the chiefs lnd l the 
coastal elites formed the Aborigenes Rights Protection Asslci latiort' 
the first nationalist political party in West Africa. 
Disputes over the control of land also arose in th Congo 
forJ 
I
where the Belgian government gave large scale concessions ho 
capitalists . 26 They also arose in Tanzania, Zambia, Rhodeli 
South Africa , where foreign settlers , backed by the colonihl --­
appropriated large acreages . In almost every area in Afriba the] 
disputes formed a prominent basis for rural resis tance to bo onia� 
rule in the continent . 27 II 
, and 
"rat� 
It should also be noted that disputes over land ri hts r 
to splits within the indigenous community , and the way in lh ch t� 
political cleavages formed in any African territory gave al s ecia� 
e 
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character to the nationalist movement of that area. One of the 
maj or characteristics of the nationalist movement in several terri-
tories , for example, was that it sought as much to depose the 
indigenous political elites , the chiefs , as it sought to displace 
the foreign administration ; and where such movements arose , they 
of ten did so in areas where the chiefs and the peasants were at 
odds over land rights .  In the Gold Coast, for example , where there 
were waste and unoccupied lands , they remained stool lands . That 
is , they remained the lands of the community and rights to these 
lands could only be alienated by the administrative head of that 
community , the chief, who was said to occupy the stool or throne . 
With the rise of the demand for cash crops from Africa , there then 
arose a demand for rights to land ; and the chiefs , in conformity 
with their traditional role , sold rights to the stool lands . The 
problem was that rather than diverting the profits from their sale 
to the communal treasury , the chiefs diverted many of the profits to 
their private pockets . Increasing indignation over their corrup-
tion led to splits between the chiefs and the masses , and these con-
flicts lent a radical character to much of the nationalist politics 
of that territory. It also led to maj or cleavages within the national-
ist forces . The chiefs and the commoners , having split over this 
and other issues , tended to back different factions of the national-
ist movement, the chiefs tending to be drawn to the United Gold 
Coast Convention, while the commoners tended to support the more 
radical Convention People ' s  Party . 28
2 
e 
A similar radicalization and polarization emerged Ln 
Uganda . In negotiating the final terms of their settlemeJt with 
the encroaching colonial power , the Kabaka and his subordJnate 
chiefs evoked a recasting of land rights in terms of freeJol 
tenure . Each maj or chief secured freehold rights over lalge 
estates in exchange for acknowledging British sovereignty j 
actual occupants of these lands then became tenants of thl ief s 
Ill With the growth in the commercial value of these lands --la 
which principally resulted from the spread of cotton produc 
I 
Uganda -- the chiefs were able to use their control over la 
to divert revenues from the producers to themselves . The� 
by raising the rental fees on the land and by increasing bh 
of services required of the tenants . The result was the bm 
of a maj or cleavage between the traditional elites and thb 
farmers -- a split that was only partially healed by the ba 
rent control laws . 29 
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Other kinds of political cleavages arose in dispu es ov. 
land clgh<•.  Some oeeurred be<ween eo�i<ie• , a• �j o, i dige�••• 
communities filed competing claims over lands .
30 Others to k th� 
form of conflicts between different levels of government; t ese � 
often appeared to be communal in nature . Groups which in he p� 
had eonquered o<her• re•ponded <o <he gr�ing profi<• <o �e goi� 
from agriculture by attempting to increase the extent and v lue � I 
<ribu<e obliga<i�•l �<he•• obliga<ion• were paid from � < .JI,.,,,, 
to property taxes at the local level , these disputes often arose 
 
the form of disputes converning the allocation of j urisdict�ons 'd�er 
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land . 31 So-called age old disputes between different indigenous 
communities thus often fundamentally revolved around the allocation 
of legal rights to this productive resource . And those seeking to 
benefit economically from the growth of commercial production had 
good reason to invest in political efforts to seek a favorable 
determination of rights to land . 
One last kind of dispute over land rights is of 
interest -- conflicts over collective as opposed to individual forms 
of tenure . Collective rights assure access to land , or to the profits 
to be realized from its use in commercial agriculture , to all members 
of a community . In insuring everyone access to these benefits , how-
ever, such rights also reduce the ability of entrepreneurs to secure 
maximum returns from commercial agriculture . Collective rights 
increase the costs of securing credit ; and they curtail the incentive 
of producers to invest in improvements which would increase the pro-
ductivity of the land . Those who sought to maximize their private 
advantage in the emerging agricultural industries of Africa therefore 
sought private rights in land ; those who were more concerned with 
securing guaranteed access to a subsistence level of production 
favored the establishment of collective rights . This conflict appears 
to have been most frequently j oined in East Africa . In Uganda , for 
example, it took the form of the militant reassertion of traditional 
clan rights over the lands that had been alienated to the chiefs under 
freehold tenure . The dedication to clan rights formed much of the 
basis of the Bataka Association -- a movement of the farmers and the 
4 
clan heads who opposed the power of the chiefs in general l anH the; 
private rights over the mailo lands in particular . 32 Analogous 
disputes broke out among the Kikuyu. Prosperous farmers lo 
to advance their claims to individual tenure , which otherl s 
ht 
ught! 
emphasize collective rights to mbari lands out of fear offlo�ing 
their rights to land in the Kikuyu reserves . 33 The assertio 
private rights over collective property by the chiefs of �he' 
I Coast underlay much of the rural politics in that area. An 
of 
I 
Gold 
. Iin t 
contemporary period , the attempts by the state in Tanzanil t' I prowlte 
collective rights to land in the cash cropping regions t 
territory has apparently found favor among the rural poor, 0 f 
the loss of land rights in the countryside , while meeting h 
resistance on the part of the prosperous farmers , ly s 
such measures as threatening the gains which they seek tols�cure 
through cash crop production. 34
VI . TAXATION 
There is a last set of issues which arose in c[nj uncti 
with the commercialization of agriculture : those which 1evblved 
around taxation. As is well known, taxation was repeate,ly l used 
public policy makers to induce subsistence farmers to exdha�ge 
pcuduua uc labuc foe u�b; aa auuh , i<s in<cuduu<iun �' �Ch 
resistance by African rural dwellers .  More relevant to ohis cha 
however , was the behavior of the farmers once they had bjgun to 
for the market . For a variety of reasons , they continue� t� enga 
r ,  
duce 
in 
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political protest agains t the levying of taxes . 
Leaving out of consideration for the moment the properties 
of public goods , we can view the payment of taxes as an exchange . 
The private citizen relinquishes the power to purchase a basket of 
commodities provided in the private marketplace in exchange for a 
collection of public goods and services provided by the state . In 
making this exchange, the rural dwellers in Africa have repeatedly 
protested that the rate of exchange was unfavorable , and that the 
goods and services received from the state failed to equal in value 
the private commodities forsaken due to the payment of taxes . 
One example of this reaction arose in the early tax 
rebellions of the 1850s . In the Gold Coast , for example ,  the 
colonial administration had convened a series of local assemblies to 
announce that in order to provide a variety of services --
roads , schools , and hospitals , for example -- the government would 
be imposing a capitation tax. For a brief period , the tax was 
successfully collected; but then resistance broke out . Opposition 
grew to the point of large scale rebellion and no serious attempt 
was made to collect the tax after 1852 . Upon investigating the 
resistance to taxes , the colonial administration determined that 
"only about one-fifth the amount collected . • •  had been spent on the 
obj ects for which it was given . •i35 A maj or grievance was that 
"the stipends and expenses of collection swallowed up nearly the 
whole revenue , and the people became restless at the failure to 
provide the promised benefits . 1136 The people protested taxes 
be�ause they felt that the taxes made them worse off; the lbs 
I comp ens income which they suffered from taxation had not been 
in 
ted 
for by public services of comparable value . So s trong were! ttleir 
feelings on the matter , ans so successfully did they act upon 
them, that the Gold Coast govenunent was unable to impose dlrect 
taxes until 1943 . 
A second maj or source of grievance over the collect 
 
on 
of taxes often fed into and exacerbated the split between the 
chiefs and the masses that arose with respect to land rightk . In 
the absence of an ability to provide satisfactory services , I ttte 
colonial government ' s  exercise of its power of taxation in the cou 
side led to a redistribution of income between the tax-payilg 
peasantry and the holders of public office. Protests over laxatio 
thus frequently became protests against rural office holderb , l the 
most prominent of whom were the chiefs . Kilson' s analysis �f I the 
rural basis of the nationalist movement in Sierra Leone emphasizes 
these dynamics . 37 So too do many of the studies of rural plotlest 
Ghana . Thus Tordoff notes that with the commercialization bf 
I 
agriculture in the inland areas of the Gold Coast ,  the chiefs lused 
I 
their powers of taxation to build up the public treasury ; the l fund 
of the Native Authorities were supposed to be used to p·rovike 
public goods , but the rural public authorities largely failld 
to supply these amenities . The result was that "the number! o 
destoolments increased rapidly and underlined the basic ins�c�rity 
of the chief ' s  tenure of office . Malcontents were quick to! seize 
6 
y-
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the opportunity of accusing their ruler of misappropriating stool 
money, and the failure of most chiefs to keep proper accounts made 
this charge difficult to rebut . 1138 In his analysis of the changing 
role of the chief in the Gold Coas t ,  Busia makes a similar point 
and provides data on local government finances which help to 
substantiate the argument . Busia' s data show that during the 
early to mid-1940s over eighty percent of the expenditures of the 
Native authorities were for "administrative expenses , "  i . e . , for 
salaries , by and large , and less than twenty percent for education , 
medical services , capital works , and other improvements . 39 Because
of the failure to provide services , the payment of taxes thus 
appeared to involve not a creation of public benefits but rather a 
redistribution of income between cash crop producers and those who 
drew their incomes from the state; and naturally , the rural 
producers resented this transfer . 40
Two other features of the taxation of cash crop producers 
generated political protest in colonial Africa. One is the inherent 
nature of public goods . In the case of public goods and services , 
such as roads or law and order , it is reasonable for citizens to 
misrepresent the value they place on them and to protest that they 
are being charged too much for them. Being public goods , the goods 
provided by the state will be available for consumption by the 
taxpayer irrespective of the amount he actually pays for them. The 
taxpayer would in fact do best by letting others p ay for the public 
goods , which he could then consume for free. The African cash crop 
producer , like taxpayers everywhere ,  were thus simply behaving in 
a way that maximized their own private welfare when they dJni 
the value of the services which they received from the govlrn 
as being of too low a quantity or quality and when they coJde 
as excessive the level of taxation which they are asked to 
for these services . Political protest and taxation simply ! gci 
together . 
Secondly , the power of taxation is the power to coe' 
and this power can be used to redistribute income . Redistlib 
I 
makes some people better off by making some people worse off ; 
ce , 
tiort 
and 
the latter group will of course not voluntarily consent tol redis-
tributive measures . When taxes are used in this way, they[ tlleref 
lead to political protest ,  be it rural Africa or anywhere else . 
 
This pattern is clearly revealed in the political 
conflicts between small-scale subsistence and large-scale lo 
I 
farmers in Kenya and in the emergence of anti-colonial politi 
I 
that country . The commodities boom of the early twenties inc 
the commercial farmers '  demand for labor . The government ' l r, 
ere 
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cru 
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of 1'1>o�r• for ra1.lway o�•<�o<ion, "'' ling•ring •ffoo<j o 
loss of population in World War I ,  and the loss of population! 
postwar outbreaks. of influenza - all had reduced the laboj s 
commercial producers were unwilling to increase the level Jf 
which they paid and they therefore experienced a shortage tf 
In response to this shortage , they championed an increase in 
of taxes on subsistence farm families as a means of redistlib 
pp111111 Th• 
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labor power from the subsistence to the commercial farm sector. In 
1920, the government raised the tax rate; because of a change in the 
budget year, the new tax was collected twice in a single calendar 
year. Largely in response to this tax, Harry Thuku organized the
first African political party in Kenya: the Young Kikuyu
Association.41 
It was not only labor that was forcefully redeployed 
between the two farming sectors. The costs of providing services 
were concentrated in one sector; the benefits from consuming them 
were reaped by the other. Thus, for example, in 1920, the colonial 
government of Kenya passed an income tax and the commercial farmers 
resisted it. Forming a Taxpayers Protection League, they opposed 
the measure in the legislative council and organized the withholding 
of tax payments. Finally, in May of 1922, they secured the repeal 
of the income tax and secured as well passage of a substitute 
financial measure: a schedule of customs rates which was designed 
to generate revenue by imposing duties on items consumed in large 
part by the native population and to provide protection for the 
commodities produced by the commercial farmers.42 
The power of taxation was thus used in Kenya to facilitate 
the redistribution of resources between different sectors of the 
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farming community; and much of the politics of that area centered around 
efforts to alter the structure of taxes and the allocation of the 
services which they financed. Similar patterns obtained 
in West Africa. Thus, for example, one of the main reasons for the 
taxpayers revolt in mid-nineteenth century Ghana was that the rural 
communities perceived that the fisc was being used to 
resources among different sections of the population. 
their resistance to taxes to which 
Kimble notes: 
The original Assemblies had thought that they were taxin 
themselves for purely local purposes, and the Accras, l fo 
example, "never could have conceived that their money wa' 
being applied in making roads and supplying medical aid 
Fantees.1143 
The Accras therefore joined the tax rebellion. 
The redistributive nature of taxation emerged inla 
ing 
form, and it too promoted political unrest. Through public £inan 
institutions, groups can achieve particular benefits whilel tnansf 
the costs of supplying them to the political community as a 
As each group can potentially secure all the benefits of al p 
measure while paying only part of the costs, each group wi�l 
demand that the political community provide those services! i 
hole_ 
rtJ.C\ 
I theri 
whi
has a particular interest, even though the total benefits loflthe 
measure are outweighed by the total costs. The Fesult is Ian 
1 
ing 
r 
re 
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supply of public services. This dynamic appeared to under[i 
of financial crises which beset rural political instituti�ns 
I refer to the fiscal crises that bedeviled the native audho 
over
l a se1iilies 
midcentury Ghana. 
As we have discussed, the rise of cocoa production 
Gold Coast increased the tax base of the rural chieftanciel.
rents, tributes, special levies, and the sale of land, thelc 
in Ml!i!i.ca. 
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strengthened their finances by transferring funds from thelccicoa 
farmers to themselves . The rise of cocoa farming also increased 
the demand for services from the chieftancies , and in particular , 
the demand for secure rights in land . The cocoa farmers obtained 
their farm lands by purchasing land rights from the chiefs ; and 
where the j urisdiction of the chiefs was uncertain , it was in the 
interest of the farmers to demonstrate through a court of law the 
j urisdictional primacy of the chief that had sold them their lands . 
The disputes between the cocoa farmers thus became disputes between 
different local chieftaincies . 
With the increased density of farms in the cocoa producing 
forest lands , the numbers of conflicting land claims multiplied ; the 
cocoa farmers therefore had more frequent occasion to seek clarifi-
cation of their chiefs ' jurisdictions . The costs of these disputes 
were borne by all of the taxpayers who fell under the j urisdiction 
of the chief ; the benefits were reaped by a particular group of 
farmers . The result of these factors was apparently to increase 
further the volume of litigation, both by raising the likelihood 
of disputes being pushed that had a low probability of winning and 
by increasing the number of appeals against adverse rulings . It was 
therefore not surprising that the costs of litigation rose to an 
alarming degree in the cocoa farming areas , and in fact imposed a 
major fiscal burden upon nat ive authorities throughout the area. 44
Much of the political unres t in the cash cropping areas of the 
Gold Coast reflected dissatisfaction with the mounting s tool debts 
and the apparent mismanagement of public finances by local 
governments . 
31 32 
The rising stool debts ,  and the attempts to remove them 
through general levies , represented a transfer of resources lto l the 
farmers who would benefit from the establishment of theitj r}ghts 
to the full capital value of their lands -- from present and lfuture 
taxpayers -- who would have to pay the costs of litigation �nvolved 
in establishing their chiefs '  j urisdiction over these lands.  
Farmers , however ,  were not always the primary beneficiaries lofl the 
redistribution of resources through fiscal measures ; indeed ,1 tf!ey 
have increasingly become the victims of such measures .  And l tHis h 
become increasingly true as ambitious political elites have lsoµght 
secure for public purposes the private resources being amassediby 
I 
those making profits from commercial agriculture . The result bas 
been political protest -- protest mounted by the farmers aglinst tH 
who sought to use the state to deprive them of their earninls .  
Political events in Ghana best illustrate this ariument . 
In June 1954 Ghana became self-governing. The nationalist 
government sought to realize the ambitions that had fueled it 
attempts to wrest power from the hands of foreigners by moult�ng 
I 
a maj or development program -- a program which would not only �rin 
greater prosperity to the country as a whole but which also  
the diversification of the economy , would reduce the count� ' 
vulnerability to fluctuations in the price of cocoa. In Aulust 
the government therefore enacted the Cocoa Duty and Development 
Funds (Amendment) Bill -- a measure to freeze the producer br�ce 
of cocoa for four years and to increase the rate of progreslidn of
the cocoa duty. 
33 
The effect of the first feature of this legislation was to 
hold steady the price paid to the farmers while allowing the 
Marketing Board , which purchased the crop from the farmers and sold 
it abroad , to sell at whatever price prevailed in the world market . 
As in the past,  the Board would accumulate the difference between 
the two prices ; but at a time when people expected the world price 
to rise , the effect of fixing local prices at the level proposed by 
the government appeared to be the appropriation by the government 
of an increasing percentage of the earnings of the cocoa farmers 
The effect of the second feature of the 1954 legislation 
was to redistribute funds from the Marketing Board to the government 
itself . The trading surpluses of the Marketing Board were often 
used for purposes that little benefitted the farmer . The high 
salaries it paid its officials , and its inflated costs of 
marketing, represented transfers from the farmers to the directors 
and managers of the state agency . Many of its trading surpluses 
were invested in low bearing treasury notes , and so were in effect 
used to provide a subsidized loan from the farmers to the government .  
The trading surpluses also financed a price-stabilizing fund ; but 
this was rarely employed to shelter the farmers from slumps in the 
cocoa price. Nonetheless , by law, the trading surpluses were at least 
supposed to be used to benefit the farmers . And by employing these 
funds to investigate cocoa diseases and to control their spread , to 
rehabilitate cocoa farms , to conduct research on behalf of 
the cocoa industry, and to provide scholarships for the children of 
cocoa farmers , the Marketing Board did in fact use a portion of its 
trading surpluses to provide benefits to the cocoa farmers i �y 
increasing the cocoa duty , however , the government sought , I fojr an) 
pair of producer and sales prices , to reduce the amount of l sujrplu, 
accruing to the Marketing Board . It therefore sought to divelrt 
the funds from an agency mandated to use its trading surplls Ion 
behalf of the cocoa industry to the government -- an agenci whose 
constituency included all sectors of the economy and whose [ mandatE 
was to bring prosperity not to the cocoa indus try but to the lnati 
as a whole . 
The cocoa farmers reacted vigorously to the passage of 
the legislation. Most of the farmers resided in the Ashanli l area 
organized by dissenting politicians , many vigorously backek tthe 
development of a regionalist political movement , named the 
National Liberation Movement , which called for greater aut'ton!my 
for Ashanti and for a weakening of the central government ' .s isca 
powers . As Beckman succinctly states : 
From the point of view of Ashanti , the federal issue anc 
the cocoa price were of course greatly related. Greate1 
regional autonomy would serve to redirect a greater pbrrlion 
of cocoa revenue to its origin . 45 
" 
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Ambitious governments have thus designed fiscal measure: 
to accumulate resources out of cash cropping and to use thbse to
finance the development of other sectors . And cash crop ploducersll�!llave 
vigorously resisted this redis tribution . Opposition to pjbllcall 
•pon,orrul ��p•orrie• ha' characrerired rhe behavior of cjah cropl 
producers throughout Africa. Most commonly , it has taken Ith for 
of smuggling . Government s ,  of course ,  have sought to curtlail thi 
35 
activity . And resistance to government efforts to surpr ess illegal 
markets has become a muted form of political protest analogous , 
perhaps , to the resistance to poaching laws in post-feudal Europe .  
More dramatic , but less frequent , have been open rebellions such 
as those mounted by the cocoa farmers of Ibadan . 46 The use of 
taxation to redistribute income from country to town, from 
agriculture to industry, from farmer to bureaucrat ,  industrialis t ,  
o r  worker - - the use of the power o f  the state in this manner is 
one of the most po tent sources of rural political protest in Africa. 
VII .  CONCLUSION 
In this essay, we have examined the relationship between 
the commercialization of agriculture and the rise of political protest 
in Africa. We have done so by asking why those who seek profits from 
the production of agricultural commodities should leave the market-
place and enter the political arena . We have seen that several cqn-
siderations account for this behavior . The structure of the markets 
which producers confronted in their search for profits provided an 
incentive to combine . The existence of significant production 
externalities promoted public intervention in an attempt to secure 
greater profitability for the industry as a whole. Those who 
benefitted from these externalities , and those who simply resented 
the use of coercion on African peasants by a foreign power , then 
turned to politics to alter the government ' s  behavior . The allocation 
of land rights had a strong bearing on the ultimate allocation of the 
benefits produced by the commercialization of agriculture ; 
allocation was determined by the state ; and these considlr 
provided a rationale for those seeking profits from agrilu 
engage in political action . Lastly , the state influencel 
bution of profits from cash cropping through its use of bh 
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levy taxes . Through political action , African cash crop i pDoduc 
sought to alter the structure of taxes and the allocat ion 
b�efi'' whieh ,hey fJnaneed . Ineeea•ingly , 'he poli,i•rl 
of cash crop producers have focused on attempts to prevent 
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fiscation of their earnings by the state and their redeplo 
other sector s .  Sporadic resistance against market contrb1 
payers rebellions , and movements in support of regional lu 
all constitute attempts by rural dwellers to use coerciol 
the profits which they seek to realize from the commercill 
of agricultural products . 
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DATE 
Palm Oil 
1909 1.  7 
10 2 . 2  
11 2 . 3  
12 2 . 0  
13 2 . 0  
14 2 . 5  
15 3 . 4 
16 3 . 9 
17 5 . 4  
18 5 . 1  
19 8 . 0  
20 7 . 6  
21 9 . 0  
22 10 . 7 
23 12 . 4  
24 14 . 1  
25 18 . 7 
26 18 . 5  
27  18 . 4  
28  26 . 5  
29 30 . 3  
30 37 . 0  
31 36 . 6  
32 38 . 8  
33 52 . 5  
34 45 . 0  
35 56 . 8  
36 60 . 0  
37 69 . 1  
38 7 0 . 3 
39 72 . 5  
TABLE 1 .  
ZAIRE 
Palm 
Kernel Oil 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . .
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
-
-
-
-
0 . 1  
Palm 
Kernels 
5 . 2  
6 . 1  
6 . 8  
5 . 9  
7 . 2  
8 . 1 
11. 0  
22 . 4  
35 . 0  
31. 4 
37 . 3  
39 . 5  
46 . 0  
49 . 3  
54 . 6  
47 . 5  
74 . 1  
70 . 4  
74 . 0  
72 . 5  
75 . 4 
66 . 4  
47 . 2  
5 7 . 9  
62 . 1  
49 . 3  
65 . 0  
92 . 4  
95 . 6  
88 . 7  
84 . 8  
EXPORTS OF PALM OIL , PALM 
(Thousand metr 
FRENCH WEST AF 
Palm 
Palm Oil Kernel Oi 
. . .  
Jr · l . . .  17 . 3  . . .  . . .  . . .  . . . }9 . 9  . . .  . . .  . . .  
. . .  
. . .  
. . .  
. . .  }9 . 4  . . .  
. . .  
25 . 8  . . .  
26 . 0  . . . 
25 . 4  . . .  
25 . 9  . . .  
17 . 4  . . .  
22 . 9  . . . 
22 . 5  . . .  
20 . 9  . . .  
14 . 6  . . .  
12 . 1  . . .  
15 . 4  . . .  
26 . 5  . . .  
29 . 2  . . .  
20 . 1  . . .  
13 . 7 . . .  
13 . 4  . . . 
7 I I 
ERNEL OIL , AND PALM KERNELS 
· c  tons ) I 
ICA NIGERIA SIERRA ],E NE 
Palm Palm al 
Rernels Palm Oil Kernels Palm Oil K rnei[ll -I 
83 . 4 161 . 4  3 . 5  4 . 6
78 . 1  175 . 8  2 . 7  4 . 7
46 . 3  80 . 6  179 . 2  3 . 0 4 • 6
44 . 3 78 . 2  187 . 6  3 . 0 5 . 6  
84 . 4  17 7 . 5  2 . 5  5 . 0 
7 3 . 7 165 . 1  1 .  8 � . 5 
74 . 2  155 . 8  2 . 0  4 • 3
6 8 . 5 164 . 0  2 . 3  4 . o  
50 . 9  75 . 8  189 . 0  2 . 2  5 • 0 
87 . 8  208 . 5  1 . 1 4 . 5  
' 102 . 6 220 . 4  3 . 4 5 • 4
86 . 2  210 . 3  2 . 1  . 2  
53 . 6 155 . 8 0 . 2  . 1  }5 . 9  89 . 0  181. 6 2 . 1  . 8  
101. 0  226 . 8  3 . 4 . 5  
72 . 1  126 . 0  256 . 6  3 . 2  . 1  
7 3 . 3 130 . 2  277 . 3  3 . 0  . 2  
70 . 2  115 . 1  253 . 1 2 . 9  . 0  
74 . 5  115 . 1  261.  3 3 . 7 . 5  
59 . 5  128 . 1  249 . 1  2 . 6  . 2  
62 . 4  132 . 9  254 . 1  2 . 9  . 2  
78 . 4  136 . 8  262 . 8  3 . 7 
65 . 7  118 . 8 257 . 4  1 . 4 
71. 0 116 . 2  312 . 4  2 . 2  
5 3 . 5 128 . 9  262 . 5  1 . 6 
76 . 6  113 . l  292 . 8  2 . 3  
80 . 7  143 . 2  316 . 3  2 . 9  
98 . 5  163 . 7  390 .  8 1 . 2 
81 . 5  146 . 2  341 . 6 2 . 4  
70 . 3  110 . 4  315 . 6  1. 4 
55 . 2  128 . 1  304 . 8  1. 2 
138 
TABLE 1 .  
(Thousand met i c  tons) 
DATE ZAIRE FRENCH WEST AF RICA NIGERIA SIERRA Lli:ONEJ 
Palm Kernels & Palm Kernel Oil 
Palm Oil & Palm Palm Palm Pa] 
Oil Oil Kernels Kernels Palm Oil Kernel OiJ Kernels Palm Oil Kernels Palm Oil 
111 
Kerne1 
1940 65 . 3 .  0 . 2  44 . 9  45 . 3  11 . 9  . . .  5 1 . 6 134 . 9  239 . 2  1 . 4  5fl . l  
41 60 . 3  0 . 5  30 . 2  31 . 1  15 . 7  . . .  46 . 5  129 . 8  384 . 2  0 . 1  3 7 •  8 
42 79 . 4  4 . 8 52 . 5  63 . 2 7 . 8  . . .  41 . 7 153 . 7 350 . 1  0 . 3 2D . 9  
43 9 9 . 1  6 . 8  63 . 2  7 8 . 3 7 . 8  . . .  50 . 5  137 . 4  336 . 6  - 317 . 0  
44 86 . 9  5 . 6  56 . 9  69 . 3  10 . 6  . . .  50 . 1  126 . 8  318 . 6  - 4b . 4  
45 77 . 9  7 . 8 43 . 5  60 . 8  4 . 8 . . .  46 . 3  116 . 0  298 .  2 - 48 . 1  
46 88 . 1  9 . 4  48 . 9  6 9 . 8  0 . 7 . . .  35 . 4  102 . 5  281 .  7 0 . 1  417 . 5  
47  84 . 9  11 . 1  48 . 1  72 . 8 0 . 7  . . .  40 . 0  128 . 0  321 . 5  0 . 6  6f. . o  
48 110 . 4  17 . 6  83 . 4  121 .  7 10 . 8  - 6 3 . 3 141 . 5 332 . 4  2 . 2  6 17 . 5 
49 117 . 8  12 . 2  80 . 0  106 . 5  9 . 8  - 85 . 5  172 . 9  381 . 9  3 . 4  717 . 8  
50 125 . 0  12 . 8  85 . 8  113 . 6 11 . 2  0 . 6  84 . 5  85 . 8  175 . 8  416 . 8  2 . 0  T1 . 4  
51 128 . 1  17 . 2  86 . 2  123 . 6  14 . 5  - 75 . 3  152 . 1  352 . 6  3 . 2  7 :> . 3  
52  137  . 5  11 . 2  92 . 5  116 . 8  9 . 5  0 . 4  64 . 2  65 . 0  170 . 0  380 . 2  0 . 8  7 7 .  6 
53  131 . 8  15 . 0  87 . 6  120 . 2  16 . 3  - 85 . 7  203 . 9  406 . 6  0 . 4  7b . O  
54  136 . 8  24 . 3  71 .  3 124 . 1  14 . 4  - 81.  3 211 . 8  471 . 6  0 . 9  69 . 2  
55  149 . 0  34 . 6  62 . 8  138 . 0  18 . 3  - 6 3 . 5  185 . 1  440 . 2  . . .  58 . 6 
Source : K . R. M. Anthony , Bruce F .  Johnston ,  William 0 .  Jones , vJctor C .  Uchendu , Agricultural Change in Tropical [ 
Africa , Cornell University Press ,  Forthcoming 1978 . 
. . • Not available 
- None at all 
- ----� -- ·  - --
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TABLE 2 . coco4 EXPORTS
(Thousand metric tons) 
YEAR CAMEROON FRENCH WEST AFRICA GHANA NIGERIA 
I 
1909 3 . 3 - 20 . 5 2 . 3 
10 3 . 4 - 23 . 0 3 . 0  
11 3 . 6 - 40 . 4 4 . 5  
12 4 . 6 - 39 . 3 3 . 4  
13 4 . 5  0 . 1 51 . 4 3 . 7
14 3 . 2 - 5 3 . 7 5 . 0
15 3 . 4 0 . 1 78 . 5 9 . 2
16 0 . 8 0 . 2 73 . 3 9 . 1  
17  1 . 1 0 . 3 9 7 . 4 15 . 7
18 0 . 7 0 . 4 6 7 . 4 10 . 4
19 2 . 3 1 . 0 107 . 0 26 . 1
1920 2 . 6 1 . 0 126 . 8 1 7 . 4
21  3 . 3 1 . 5  135 . 3 18 . 2
22 3 . 5  2 . 4 161 .  9 31 . 8
23  3 . 5  3 . 6  200 . 8 33 . 3
24 4 . 5  4 . 3 226 . 9 37 . 8
25 4 . 9 6 . 3 221 . 6 45 . 4
26 5 . 4 6 . 9 234 . 5 39 . 7  
2 7  7 . 6  9 . 8 213 . 3 39 . 8
28 7 . 3 16 . 5 228 . 7 46 . 3
29  10 . 0 16 . 5 241 . 9 53 . l
1930 10 . 6 22 . 3 193 . 6 50 . 2
31 10 . 9 19 . 9 248 . 0 50 . 6
32 13 .  8 25 . 8 237 . 5 28 . 8
33 17 . 2 31 . l 239 . 9 5 8 . 0 
34 19 . 5 41 . 6 234 . 0 74 . 6
35 23 . 4 43 . 6 273 . 2 85 . 4
36 2 3 . 8 49 . 8 316 . 1 7 7 .  0
37 26 . 6 48 . 1 240 . 0 100 . 0
38 31 . 0 52 . 7 267 . 4 94 . 8
39 2 7 . 6 55 . 2 285 . 2 115 . 7
YEAR CAMEROON 
1940 24 . 4  
41 20 . 4  
42 lS . O  
43  32 . 4  
44 3S . 1  
4S 34 . 8  
46 34 . 0  
47  33 . 7 
48 47 . 9  
49 48 . 0  
19SO 43 . 7  
Sl  48 . 8  
S2 Sl . l  
S3  60 . S  
S4  so . o  
SS SS . 6  
Source : See source Table I .  
TABLE 2 .  COCOA EXP ORTS (cont ' d . )  
(Thousand metri c tons) 
FRENCH WEST A�ICA 
4S . S  
43 . 0  
28 . 6  
o . s  
14 . 7  
26 . 9  
2 8 . 4 
2 8 . 1 
41 . 2  
S6 . l  
61 .  8 
ss . s  
S0 . 2  
7 1 .  7 
S2 . 7  
7S . 2  
0 
GHANA NIGERIA 
227 . S  91 . 2  
222 . 4  106 . 4  
12S . 9  60 . 9  
190 . 4  88 . 9  
206 . 1  71 .  2 
236 . 0  7 8 . 2 
240 . 0  101 . 8 
183 . 1  112 . 6  
217 . 7  92 . 9  
267 . 8  118 . 0  
271 .  7 9 2 . 9  
233 . 2  123 . 4  
21S . 4  116 . 6  
240 . 4  106 . 3  
217 . 6  100 . 0  
209 . 2  89 . 8  
YEAR ZAIRE 
1909 -
10 -
11 -
12 -
13 -
14 -
15 -
16 -
17 -
18 -
19 0 . 2
1920 0 . 2
21 0 . 2 
22 1 . 0  
23 . . .  
24 . . .  
25 1 .  3
26 2 . 2
27  5 . 2
28 7 . 5  
29 9 . 6  
1930 10 . 0
31 12 . 5  
32 12 . 1
33 12 . 8 
34 20 . 0
35 23 . 5
36 26 . 5
37 32 . 3
38 42 . 0
39 35 . 5
FRENCH EQUITORIAL 
AFRICA 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0 . 1
0 . 2
0 . 8 
0 . 9
1 . 6
2 . 4
5 . 1
6 . 2
6 . 7
8 . 4 
9 . 9
8 . 8 
TABLE 3 .  
UGANDA 
. . .
-
3 . 0
3 . 9
4 . 3
5 . 4
4 . 6
3 . 9
5 . 0
5 . 0
. . .  
9 . 5
14 . 8
8 . 8
16 . 0
23 . 3
35 . 6
32 . 8 
23 . 9
25 . 1
37 . 0
23 . 4
34 . 3  
3 7 . 6 
5 3 . 5 
51 .  8
45 . 9  
58 . 3
61 . 4
73 . 0
59 . 8
41 
tons) 
MOZAMBIQUE NIGERIA SUDAN 
- 2 . 3 
- 1 . 1  
- 1 . 0
- 2 . 0
- 2 . 9
- 2 . 6
- 1 . 2
- 3 . 4  3 . 5
- 2 . 4 2 . 6
- 0 . 7 2 . 2 r 
- 3 . 1  4 . 3 l - 3 . 3 3 . 5  
0 . 2 5 . 8 5 . 0 :U .  
0 . 2 3 . 0  4 . 4  :U .  
0 . 3 3 . 2  5 . 1 :U .  
0 . 4 4 . 7 8 . 4  2 i . 1 . 4  6 . 7 7 . 8 4i ·  
2 . 0 9 . 1 22 . 2 1 -
1 . 3  5 .1  28 . 9 4i .
1 . 2  3 . 8 23 . 5 1 ·  
1 . 6 6 . 0 30 . 5 l 
1 .  7 8 . 1 2 7 . 8 � -
1 . 5  3 . 6 9 . 0 4 ·  
1 .  8 1 . 2 38 . 2 3 .  I 
2 . 3 4 . 5  24 . 4 1 ·  
2 . 0 6 . 0 33 . 0 5 1 ·  
2 . 9 11 . 0 37 . 7 10 . 
4 . 8 11 . 3 48 . 0 i:il.  
8 . 4 9 . 7 70 . 4 i:il.  I 
8 . 9 5 . 8 62 . 3  9 .
6 . 6 4 . 4  61 . 7 d.
__ 1 
TABLE 3 .  
YEAR ZAIRE 
1940 23 . 0
41 25 . 7
42 32 . 3 
43 41.  3
44 30 . 0
45 38. 3
46 48 . 0
47 45 . 1
48 51 . 2
49 46 . 8
1950 49 . 0
51  39 . 8
52  45 . 7
5 3  45 . 6
54 40 . 7 
55  40 . 0
FRENCH EQUITORIAL 
AFRICA 
8 . 8
17 . 7
17 . 5
10 . 0
17 . 5
20 . 0
24 . 8
21 . 1
32 . 3
23 . 6
24 . 0
2 7 .  0 
29 . 4
25 . 0
31. 7
33 . 0
Source : See source Table I .
Not available 
None at all 
(Thousand 
UGANDA 
55 . 1
66 . 4
42 . 9
22 . 3
34 . 3
48 . 0
39 . 8
45 . 9
31 . 6
70 . 8
6 3 . 2
62 . 8
6 8 . 5  
6 0 . 8
71 . 4
55 . 6
42 
(cont ' d . )
MOZAMBIQUE NIGERIA SUDAN A 
5 . 2 9 . 5 37 . 6
6 . 6 10 . 4 84 . 2
14 . 3 18 . 8 50 . 8
15 . 4 7 . 3  9 . 5  
23 . 9 4 . 4  22 . 7
14 . 3 1 . 1 73 . 8
10 . 9  6 . 7 52 . 9
5 . 9 5 . 3 52 . 7
26 . 0 4 . 7 50 . 8
28 . 1 10 . 1 65 . 2
24 . 4 12 . 8 66 . 5  
24 . 1 15 . 6 95 . 5
30 . 1 19 . 6 55 . 2
38 . 3 18 . 0 90 . 2
38 . 3 26 . 4 60 . 4  
32 . 8 33 . 7 94 . 7
YEAR ANGOLA ZAIRE 
1909 4 . 4  -
10 6 . 1 -
11 4 . 4 -
12 4 . 0 -
13 4 . 8 -
14 4 . 4 -
15 4 . 0 -
16 3 . 2 -
17  4 . 1 -
18 4 . 2 0 . 1 
19 6 . 2 0 . 2
1920 3 . 9 0 . 1 
21 5 . 1 -
22 9 . 8 0 . 2
23  6 . 0 0 . 1
24 8 . 9 0 . 4
25 12 . 6 0 . 2
26 9 . 3 0 . 2
27  10 . 0 0 . 3 
28 9 . 8 0 . 6
29  8 . 8 0 . 8 
1930 11. 8 1 . 5  
31 11. 8 2 . 9
32 9 . 5 5 . 4  
33 12 . 0 8 . 5
34 11 . 7 12 . 4
35 10 . 3 13 . 2
36 19 . 6 16 . 8
37 16 . 4 16 . 0
38 17 . 5 19 . 1
39 20 . 7  19 . 7
COFFL EXPORTSTABLE 4 .
(Thousand met1ic tons) I 
CAMEROON ETHIOPIAI 
- H:: ----
- l3 . 4I 
-
f · 7
- t · 2- . 1I 
- B . lI 
- r - 6- . 1I 
- � . l- . 6
- .5 .  6 
-
I 
11 . l
-
I 
10 . 4
-
I 
11 . 5I 
- lf . O
- ! . .- . .  
- lt - 1- 1 . 1
0 . 1
I 
lL l I 
0 . 5 12 . 5I 
0 . 8 lr 2
1 . 4  1 1 . 2I 
2 . 0 8 . 7 
2 . 6 9 . o 
4 . 2 l . .  
5 . 3  l . .
43 1 1  
IVORY 
COAST KENYA UGANDA 
- 0 . 4 - . .  J I 
0 . 6- - 1 .  � I 
- 0 . 7 0 . 1 1 .  
- 1 . 0 0 . 2 1 .
- 1 .  3 0 . 6 1 .
- 1 . 5 1 . 1 . . . 
• •  J - 1 . 1 2 . 2
- 4 . 4 2 . 6 • •  j 
- 5 . 0 1 . 0 . . 1 - 8 . 5 4 . 5  . • i 
- 6 . 2 3 . 0 4 .  ( 
- 8 . 0 3 . 7 - 1
- - 2 . 5 3 .  
- 6 . 6 2 . 6 4 .  
0 . 1 9 . 4 2 . 1 4 .  
- 10 . 1 2 . 1 5 .
- 7 . 5 1 . 5  6 .
6 . 1  0 . 1 7 . 2 1 .  7 I 
0 . 2 10 . 7 2 . 2 6 .  i 
0 . 2 10 . 8 2 . 0 10 . I  
0 . 4 6 . 8 2 . 1 9 . (  
I 
0 . 5 15 . 8 2 . 5 11.
0 . 7 12 . 5 3 . 6 9 .  
1 . 4 14 . 0 4 . 4 11.  
1 .  8 13 . 1 5 . 1 12 . 
2 . 7 9 . 5 7 . 8 15 . 
5 . 3 18 . 2 6 . 4 18 .  
6 . 7 20 . 8 11 . 6 12 . 
10 . 4  13 . 9 13 . 1 13 . 
14 . 5 17 . 4 14 . 2 14.  
18 . 6 17 . 2 17 . 4 16 . 
YEAR ANGOLA ZAIRE 
1940 15 . 8 13 . 2
41 14 . 2 18 . 3  
42 19 . 5 19 . 7
43 23 . 9 22 . 4
44 2 3 . 8 14 . 9
45 30 . 9 24 . 3
46 44 . 3 26 . 8
47 40 . 6 37 . 3
48 5 3 .  4 30 . 5
49 46 . 4 31 . 4
1950 37 . 6 32 . 7
51 64 . 4 34 . 5  
52  47 . 7 30 . 3
53  71 . 6 33 . 5  
54  44 . 2 35 . 4  
55 5 7 . 9 43 . 7
Source : See source Table I .
Not available 
None at all 
TABLE 4 .  COFFEE EXf'ORTS (cont ' d . )
(Thousand 
I 
IVORY 
CAMEROON ETHTPIA COAST 
4 . 2 } lf . o 17 . 10 . 1 29 . 06 . 6 20 . 08 . 6 23 .. 0 
5 . 1 24 . 5
6 . 7 10 . 0 39 . 2
5 . 9 l.D .  9 36 . 4
5 . 6 l� . 9 44 . 1
7 . 3 l.D .  3 56 . 3I 
8 . 2 22 . 4 6 3 . 7 
7 . 7  1� . 7 5 7 . 7
8 . 7 3 ,  . 3 62 . 9  I 
9 . 2 21 . 4  71 . 4
9 . 6  4l3 . 1 56 . 4I 
11 . 4 3f . 2 94 . 9
13 . 9 41 . 8 85 . 8
44 
KENYA UGANDA I I 
8 . 7 18 . 2 15 . 
12 . 6 20 . 6 13 .  
12 . 5 17 . 5 15 . 
7 . 9 20 . 5  11 . 
7 . 6 19 . 4 15 . 
7 . 6 20 . 6 14 . 
9 . 7 31 . 9 10 . 
10 . 8 21 . 4 14 .  I 
14 . 5 38 . 4 11 . 1 
' 7 . 9  24 . 3 12 . 
10 . 4 32 . 4 15 . 
10 . 1 44 . 3 16 . 
17 . 0 40 . 1 18 .  
15 . 0 36 . 3 15 . 
10 . 9 35 . 2 19 . 
19 . 7 75 . 6 18 .
YEAR 
1909 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
1920 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27  
28 
29  
1930 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
TABLE 5 .  EXPORTS OF PEANUTS AND OIL IN SHELLED NUT EQUIVALENT 
(Thousand mettic tons) 
IVORY 
COAST 
102 . 0
. . .
. . .  
157 . 7
. . .
. . .  
. . .  
. . .  
146 . 9
. . .
. . .  
. . . 
. . .
207 . 8
. . .
. . . 
317 . 6
343 . 9 
288 . 3
304 . 7 
312 . 5
381 . 5
325 . 4
139 . 2
274 . 7 
395 . 8
306 . 2
418 . 2
556 . 3 
441 . 8 
526 . 9
GAMBIA 
38 . 2
41.  6
34 . 1
45 . 6
48 . 0
47 . 6
6 8 . 4 
33 . 0
52 . 8
40 , 2
50 . 0
59 . 8
41 . 4
44 . 8
44 . 5  
43 . 1
34. 6
43 . 4
48 . 4
54 . 6
41 . 3
53 . 2
68 . 5
26 . 5
4 7 . 9
51 . 2 
32 . 1
35 . 3 
47 . 8
33 . 7 
35 . 4
NIGERIA 
1 . 6
1 . 0
1 .  3
2 . 6
19 . 6
17 . 3
9 . 1
51 . 2
51 . 1
58 . 5
L}O . 0
46 . 1
51 . 8 
24 . 3
23 . 3
79 . 5
129 . 3
128 . 8 
9 2 . 2
104 .  8 
149 . 7
148 . 7 
162 . 3
191 . l
207 . 9
248 . 8
187 . 0
221 . 9 
331 . 2 
183 . 0
149 . 6
45 
SUDAN 
0 . 2
0 . 6
0 . 8
0 . 6
0 . 5
0 . 1
0 . 4
0 . 7 
2 . 0
1 .  8 
2 . 4
2 . 0
2 . 9
1 .  9
4 . 2
7 . 3 
8 . 3
6 . 9
1 . 1
1 . 3 
2 . 6
3 . 4
2 . 0
0 . 9
2 . 2
5 . 0
3 . 1
3 . 0
4 . 8 
4 . 1
2 . 9
YEAR 
1940 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
1950 
51 
52  
53  
54 
55 
TABLE 5 .  EXPORTS OF PEANUTS AND PEANUT OI� IN SHELLED NUT EQUIVALENT (cont ' d . ) 
(Thousand metJic tons) 
IVORY 
COAST 
372 . 9 
425 . 5
107 . 1
56 . 9
191 . 0 
172 . 1
248 . 8
275 . 6
35 7 .  0 
339 . 2
36 7 . 4
307 . 4
334 . 3 
446 . 5
479 . 7
372 . 7 
GAMBIA 
30 . 7
31 . 4
12 . 0
14 . 1
21 .  3
30 . 7
28 . 8
40 . 0
49 . 7
43 . 6
41 .  8
39 . 9
43 . 3
36 . 3 
37 . 5  
40 . 0
NIGERIA SUDAN 
172 . 2 5 . 7
251 . 1 2 . 7
19 7 .  3 1 . 8 
144 . 8
156 . 7
179 . 1
290 . 3
260 . 0
249 . 9
385 . 3 9 . 1
330 . 2 3 . 3
153 . 1 10 . 0
288 . 1 1 7 . 4
376 . 1 26 . 7
507 . 1 16 . 5
482 . 8 34 . 9
Source : See source Table I .  
Not available 
None at all 
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